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ABSTRACT 
This paper searches for a new growth engine in the new Info-Tech economy. IT-network 
effects are incorporated into Romer’s (1990) framework. Network effects support long-
term steady state growth in per capita variables even without innovation, and growth rate 
increases with network externalities. Networked growth is sub-optimal, so should we 
break up an IT monopoly? To answer this we compare monopoly, Cournot and Bertrand 
set-ups. Cournot always ranks last socially, but Bertrand can be superior to monopoly if 
network effects are strong. When network interacts with Romer’s endogenous innovation, 
growth rate increases, probably by up to a percentage point per year.  
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1 
 1 INTRODUCTION 
It is almost fashionable to talk about the New Economy these days. In many ways this 
simply means the economy of the United State of America. The exceptional performance 
in computer/peripheral and information technology (IT) sectors ended the 1972-1995 
productivity slowdown and produced a record-breaking run of U.S. per capita GDP 
growth.1 Jorgenson, Stiroh, Gordon and Sichel (2000) proclaims that “A consensus is 
now emerging that something fundamental has changed, with ‘new economy’ proponents 
pointing to information technology (IT) as the causal factor behind the strong 
performance.” (p.125)  
 If this new economy is really different from the old then at its core we expect to 
find a new growth engine driving it. This paper is a theoretical attempt to search for this 
new engine of growth. In this venture existing growth models have much to offer, having 
just gone through a decade and a half of revolutionary revision led by Romer (1986, 
1990), Lucas (1988), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and many others. Yet, one would be 
hard pushed to argue that many of these leading models were sufficiently focused on the 
new economy to address the IT question head on. In some sense they were preoccupied 
with a deep-seated dissatisfaction with the assumption of exogenous growth, and were 
happy to find any growth engine for as long as it is endogenous and for as long as it 
supports per capita long-term growth. It seems clear that in order to understand the new 
economy, some essential features of IT need to be incorporated into its growth 
mechanism. Which features should be incorporated and how we should do it provide the 
starting point of our enquiry.  
                                                          
2 
1 In February 2000, the American economy set a record for the longest business expansion since records 
began in 1850. For detailed accounts of the ending of the productivity slowdown and the decade-long 
uninterrupted growth see Jorgenson (2001) and Gordon (2002). 
  An emerging literature, pertinently portrayed by Shipiro and Varian (1998), 
argues that a crucial aspect of information technology is its network effect. Such 
networks are not new, as numerous historical anecdotes would attest.2 Owning a 
telephone would be pointless without a network of friends who also own telephones. 
Networks, however, dramatically increase its prominence in the case of 
computer/peripherals/software and telecommunication. David (2000) argues that the IT-
network revolution is only beginning and we have had merely a taste of what the IT and 
the Internet may eventually offer.3 
 Networks are a powerful source of externality, and by that a potent source of 
increasing returns. Consequently, it is a good candidate for providing an engine of growth 
for the new economy. But increasing returns destroy competition. We saw it doing so 
with a vengeance in computer and IT industries, giving rise to monopolies like Microsoft, 
Intel and Yahoo. Romer (1990) deals with non-constant returns by resorting to 
monopolistic competition in the capital-cum-innovative intermediate goods sector. The 
same will not suffice for our purpose here. A central conclusion in the network 
economics literature is that the market structure tends to ‘tip’ to produce a monopoly. We 
saw numerous examples such as MS Word defeated WordPerfect word processor, IBM’s 
PC defeated McIntosh personal computers, and Matsushita’s VHS totally eliminating 
Sony’s Beta Max in video tape recording. So instead we mimic this by studying growth 
under a monopoly instead of monopolistically competition supplying the networked 
intermediate commodity. 
                                                          
2 Shapiro and Varian (1999) described achieving a unified network of railway gauges and power standard 
benefited the U.S. economy in 19th century. More recent examples are the introduction of the telephone the 
fax machine, and the color television. 
3 
3 David (ibid.) draws a parallel between computer and the dynamo emphasizing their similarity both as 
general-purpose machines. He points out that dynamo had a diffusion lag took a couple of decades. We 
should patiently await the full effect of the IT revolution as the use of computers diffuse to the economy at 
large.  
  It is easy to imagine that this networked growth equilibrium would fail to produce 
the socially optimum. It is our purpose in this paper to characterize this optimality, and to 
examine which parameters and which policies would bring us closer to that ideal. 
Towards the end of the U.S. Clinton Administration, the anti-trust legislation had taken 
an aggressive stance against Microsoft. A solution, becoming increasing unlikely under 
the Bush Administration but remains at least as an option, is to enforce rivalry by 
breaking up the monopoly. Our model again mimics this, and studies growth when the 
networked sector becomes a duopoly. Our result shows that a Cournot duopoly will 
always do worse than the monopoly, but a Bertrand duopoly may do better if the network 
effect is sufficiently strong. 
 The basic model of this paper, presented in Section two below, is closest in spirit 
to Romer’s (1990) endogenous innovation or could instead be called networked growth 
without innovation. To study social optimality and enforced rivalry (Sections three and 
four below) we continue to focus, for simplicity, on network effects without innovation. 
We are able in this endeavor to obtain social second best rankings of monopoly, Cournot 
and Bertrand duopoly. Furthermore, the interaction of network effects with endogenous 
innovation is interesting, and we allow network and innovation to interact in Section five. 
We find, assuming reasonable parameter values, the economy could grow from twenty to 
even fifty percent faster with network effects, than when there is only endogenous 
innovation as in Romer (ibid.). From a base of about two percent, network effect could 
add as much as a full percentage point to long-term per capita growth. 
 The plan of this paper is as follows. The next section presents the basic model 
under monopoly. Section three solves the social planner’s problem. Section four studies 
4 
 enforced rivalry. Section five examines interactions between networks and innovation. 
Section six concludes. 
 
2 The Model 
The economy consists of a final goods sector employing labor and an intermediate good, 
which is subject to network effects.4 The production function for the homogeneous final 
consumption good , by firm iY ...,2,1=i , at time t is 
αα
itittit KLAY
−= 1 .     (1) 
itL  is conventional homogeneous labor, of which the country, considered in isolation, is 
endowed with a stock of  at t. K is ‘capital’ which is different from traditional 
machinery in that it is subject to network externality, and it is treated for simplicity as 
Romer (1990) did as putty-putty.
tL
5 Network externality is embodies in A, the productivity 
factor, expressed as 
.;0)(),( ∑≡>=
i
itttttt KKdKKdfKfA   (2) 
This says that production technology for final good Y increases as more of the same type 
of capital K is in used in aggregate. For sharp results we let  
                                                          
4 In other words we focus on network effects in the intermediate goods sector and ignore those in the final 
good sector. This is done primarily for simplicity. To the extent that network effects are also prominent in 
final consumption goods, our results would be an underestimate. On the other hand, as late as 1999 
computer and peripherals account for only 3.5 percent of norminal GDP in the nonfarm nonhousing private 
business economy (Gordon, 2002, p.21). There exists a large portion of intermediate goods that are not 
subject to strong network effects. By assuming network effect to be strong and uniform throughout our 
intermediate sector, our result would produce an overestimate. With luck these should offset each other at 
least to some extent. 
5 
5 Romer (1990) justified this assumption by arguing that in the steady state revision of capital investment 
plans would not be necessary. In the present context we can further justify this by noting that owing to the 
rapid pace of technological obsolescence and cost reduction, more and more IT-related goods are no longer 
‘durables’. If obsolescence is sufficiently rapid then investment indeed becomes putty-putty. 
   ,  βtt KA = 10 << β .6     (2’) 
The time-subscript will henceforth be suppressed wherever confusion is not likely to 
arise.  
 Constant returns to scale ensures perfect competition in Y. Each Y-producer is too 
small to influence K and thus takes A as given. We normalize the price of Y to one. Each 
factor will be paid its marginal products. Denote the prices of K and L by p and w, the 
factor employment decisions are  
  pKAL
K
Y
ii
i
i ==∂
∂ −− 11 ααα     (3) 
  wKAL
L
Y
ii
i
i =−=∂
∂ − ααα )1( .    (4) 
 Although individual users of K are too small to take equation (2’) into account, 
the seller of K is fully aware of such effects.7 This implies that the production of K faces 
increasing returns and competition will not prevail. As mentioned earlier the information 
networks literature predicts this K-producing market structure to ‘tip’ in favor of a single 
winner such as Microsoft, IBM PC and VHS. We shall gloss over this process of 
‘tipping’, and assume a single monopolist producer of K, denoted by ‘M’.  
 Summing over i and using (2’), equation (3) gives the derived demand for K  
  ( ) βααβαα −−−−−= 1 11 1 LpK     (5) 
                                                          
6 We could have modeled network effect as capital-augmenting, e.g. Y  where 
. Clearly little will change fundamentally with my simpler specification.  
αα )(1 ititit AKL
−=
)(∑= itKfA
6 
7 Indeed companies are keen to resort to various strategies to promote and preserve benefits arising from 
network effects. Airlines’ frequent flier program and hotels’ frequent guest program are good examples.  
 where  is the total labor since it is used only in the production of Y. Let L grow 
at a constant rate n, i.e. .
∑≡
i
iLL
nt
t eLL 0= 8 In order to preserve a downward slopping demand 
for K in (5), network effect needs to be not too large. We shall assume βα >− )1(  
holds.9 
At each t total revenue from the sale of K is  
  .    (6) αβααβα αα −+−+ = 11 ttt LKLK
Suppose one unit of Y can be converted into one unit of K in each t. The monopolist M’s 
decision problem is to find a time-path of capital { }tK  to maximize the discounted profit 
flow 
  .   (7) τα τττααβατ
τ
deKeLK tr
t
n
K
)()1(1
0 ][max
−−∞ −−+ ⋅−∫
We shall take interest rate r to be constant, which will in any case be true in the 
steady state equilibrium (to be verified shortly). Since both revenue and cost are 
intertemporally separable in (7), M treats this as a period-wise static problem by choosing 
 to maximize profits in each t, yielding tK
  
nt
t eLK




−−
−
−−
−
−−+= βα
α
βα
α
βαβαα 1
1
1
1
0
1
1
)]([ .   (8) 
                                                          
8 This is a departure from Romer (1990), who uses innovative investment to drive growth. Lucas (1988) 
uses human capital investment to drive growth, thus also have little need for population growth. The 
present framework assumes population growth, on which network hinges and multiplies to generate income 
growth. This is not degeneration back to the Solow model though, for unlike in the Solow case, network 
effect is capable of generating income growth per capita. We discard population growth in Section five 
below, where network effect ‘hinges’ on Romer’s endogenous innovation. 
9 The empirical literature generally points to a value of  elasticity at individual firm’s level of ii YK →
3.0≈α  (see Walter (1963)). I have not been able to find any empirical measure on β . Condition 
βα >− )1( implies 7.0<β . This seems perfectly reasonable a priori. If a firm hires ten percent more 
Ki, say, it would only increase firm i’s output by only three percent. If instead other firms use ten percent 
more K, the external effect would be highly unlikely to be so strong as to increase i’s output by seven 
percent. To estimate the size of β  would be an interesting topic for future research. 
7 
 It follows that )1()1( βαα −−−=≡ nKKgK & . Per capita capital LKk ≡  grows at a 
rate )1( βαβ −−=≡ nkkgk & . Thus K  grows at a constant multiple rate of n, and this 
multiple rises with both α  and β. Two points are noted immediately. First, if 0=β , 
nKK =&  and 0=kk& . Capital just keep pace with population growth but remains 
constant in per capita terms. Second, 0>βddg K  and 0>βddgk . The increasing 
network externality from the increasing population size prompts the monopoly to sell 
more K, as well as more K per capita. 
 Using (8) in the square-bracketed term in (7) gives M’s profit tπ  at t. Routine 
calculation shows that )1()1( βααφπ −−−⋅= tt L  where )1()([ ))( βαβααφ βαβα −−+= −+ ] 1(1 − . 
Thus Kgng =−−−=≡ )1()1( βααπππ & . In order to channel profits back into 
consumption we assume M issues shares, which are held evenly by all citizens ( ), and 
she distributes all profits via dividends in each period t. 
tL
Now we are ready to tackle national output and consumption. Though consumers 
may still desire to even lifetime consumption via interest rate r, the consumption each 
period is fixed by the economy-wide instantaneous budget constraint where C and c are 
aggregate and per capita consumption respectively: 
  KYcLC −=≡ .     (9) 
Using (8) and (2’) in (1), national output is 
  βα
α
βα
βα
βαα −−
−
−−
+
⋅+= 1
1
1)]([ tt LY     (10) 
8 
 and it grows at a rate πβαα gngY =−−−= )1()1( .10 National output per capita, 
denoted βα
β
βα
βα
β −−−−
+
⋅ 11)] tLαα += ([ty , grows at the rate ky gng =−−= )1( βαβ . Now 
using (8) and (10) in (9), aggregate consumption is 
  βα
α
βα
βα
βααβαα −−
−
−−
+
⋅++−= 1
1
1)]()][(1[ tt LC    (11) 
and it grows at  
  πβαα ggnCCg YC ==−−−=≡ )1()1(& .   (12) 
Per capita consumption is 
  βα
β
βα
βα
βααβαα −−−−
+
⋅++−= 11)]()][(1[ tt Lc ,   (13) 
and it grows at  
  kyttc ggnccg ==−−=≡ )1( βαβ& .   (14) 
Thus the income and consumption paths are determined by the network structure 
and the monopolist’s profit-maximizing output choice, without reference to consumers’ 
intertemporal maximization. Interest rate plays a secondary role of reconciling 
consumers’ desire to smooth lifetime consumption, with the predetermined consumption 
path given in (14). Suppose we adopt the standard Ramsey utility for per capita 
consumption  tc
  dtec tt ρ
θ
θ
−∞
−
⋅



−
−= ∫0
1
1
1U     (15) 
which yields the familiar household intertemporal optimization condition 
θρ)( −= rcc& . Using (14) and rearranging, r is indeed a constant as we claimed earlier 
                                                          
10 For orders of magnitude, take 3.=α , L = one million, if 1.=β  then Y ; if 61014.2 ∗= 2.=β  
then Y . This is a fourteen-fold increase in national income when the network elasticity 7102.3 ∗=
9 
   βα
θβρ −−+= 1
nr .     (16) 
 The economy must maintain the interest rate according to (16). Recall that θ  is 
the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. A higher θ  (closer to 
zero) reflects a stronger desire to smooth consumption overtime. If βα
θβρ −+> 1
nr −  
holds, consumption are growing slower than consumer desires, whose attempt to save and 
to lend then pushes r downwards. Conversely if βα
θβρ −−+< 1
nr  the attempt to borrow 
pushes r up. 
 The most striking result of this simple model is two-fold, as it is revealed by 
equation (14). First, unlike the Solow model, per capita variables exhibit positive long-
term steady state growth. Second, this long-term steady state growth rate rises with 
network externality β . If the new economy, which we argue above is characterized by 
greater network externality than hitherto, then we should expect per capita growth rates 
of consumption and national income to experience a permanent rather than a transient 
increase in its long-term steady state. The speed limit is indeed higher in the new 
economy, and it rises in tandem with network externality β . 
 It would again be interesting to obtain some order of magnitude of growth rates 
we have obtained in theory so far. Suppose we can take 3.≈α  and a one percent 
population growth. Though the restriction βα >− )1(  allows 0 7.0<< β , we use as an 
exercise 3.0≈β . Then a network elasticity of 0.3 leads to three-quarter of a percentage 
point per capita income growth (see Figure 1a). Further, doubling population growth 
would exactly double  for every yy /& β  (see Figure 1b). If network effect β  increases 
                                                                                                                                                                             
doubles! 
10 
 from 0.3 to 0.5, growth rate rises three-fold from 0.0075 to 0.025. Suppose population 
growth is instead two percent. As β  increases from 0.3 to 0.5, growth rate rises three-
fold from 0.015 to 0.05. 
 
Put Figures 1a and 1b about here 
 
 So our first conclusion is that network effect is indeed capable of generating long-
term per capita growth, and it does so by ‘hinging’ on population growth, which is, by 
itself, incapable of generating per capita income and consumption growth. 
Our conclusion can be put in a different way. Network effect leverages on 
existing dynamic momentums such as population and multiplies it to give rise to long-
term growth in per capita variables. This in a sense represents a new category of growth 
models that we have not encountered in the literature hitherto. The new economy thrives 
on IT, which provides a wealth of network effects much richer than what we have 
experienced before. It is more than likely that the multiplier effect just described is useful 
in explaining the recent growth experience in the United States.  
 
3 Social Optimality 
In the model just described, externality causes market failure on two counts. In the first 
place each competitive Y-producing firm fails to recognize the external economies its 
usage of  has on the network community. In the second place, the monopolist producer 
of K supplies too little K resulting in a customary ‘triangular’ deadweight loss. Both 
failures can be corrected if a social planner supplies K instead of the private monopolist. 
iK
11 
 The initial set up for the social planner is identical to the one in Section two, and 
equations (1) to (5) continue to hold. Since neither of the market failures is intertemporal 
in nature, all that the social planner needs to do is to choose Kt to maximize the area 
between the derived demand curve (5) and the marginal cost (=1) of producing Kt in each 
period t. Setting  in equation (5), the social planner (asterisked) supplies 1=p
βα
α
−
−
βαα −−−= 1
1
1
1
*
tt LK , and in per capita terms 
βα
β
βαα −−−−= 11
1
*
tt Lk , both are 
)1(1** ) −+== βαkkKK ( + βα  times the monopolist’s supply of  and , for all t.tK tk 11 
Notice )1( −+βα1)+ βα(  falls as β  rises (see Figure 2). In fact 1)( )1(1 =−+βααlim .+ β∞→β 12 
The reason is that as network externality expands, the monopoly’s incentive to increase 
output increasingly offsets its urge to restrict sales. Network effect to a certain extent 
moderates the difference between socially optimal and the private monopoly path (which 
are parallel, see below) for the supply of K. 
 
Put Figure 2 about here 
 
It follows that the private and the social growth rates for capital coincide, i.e. 
KK gng =−−−= )1()1(* βαα , and kk gng =−−= )1(* βαβ .   
 Substituting tK  into (1), the socially optimal output path is  
*
                                                          
11 If 3.=α , 1.=β , 6.4* =KK ; for 3.=α , 2.=β , 4* =KK . Interestingly, the degree of 
suboptimality falls as network effect is stronger.  
12 0)]1)(log()(1[
)1(
)()(
2
12)1(1
<−+⋅++−−
+−=+
−−++−−+
βαβαβα
βα
β
βα βαβαβα
d
d . The last square 
bracketed term is positive since both α  and β  are less than one. It is of some interest to note too that 
1)(lim )1(1 =+ −+∞→ βαβ βα . Had network effect been ‘infinitely strong’ (think of this in a purely 
12 
   βα
α
βα
βα
α −−
−
−−
+
⋅= 1
1
1*
tt LY ,     (17) 
and in per capita terms 
  βα
β
βα
βα
α −−−−
+
⋅= 11* tt Ly .     (18) 
Compared to the monopoly path, )1(1** )( −++== βαβαKKYY . The private and 
social income growth rates again coincide.  
 Substituting *Y  and  into (9), the socially optimal consumption path is t
*
tK
  βα
α
βα
βα
αα −−
−
−−
+
⋅−= 1
1
1* )1( tt LC     (19) 
and in per capita terms 
  βα
β
βα
βα
αα −−−−
+
⋅−= 11* )1( tt Lc .    (20) 
The pattern under social choice compared to the equilibrium under monopoly is 
now clearly discernable. All the relevant growth rates coincide, in other words the 
socially optimal paths parallel those under monopoly. The second conclusion in this 
paper is that networked growth rates of income and consumption are in fact socially 
optimal, but the monopoly paths are everywhere below the socially optimal paths. Take 
consumption for instance. Comparing (19) and (20) with (11) and (13), 
βα
βα
βαβαα
α −− −−++−
−== 1
**
)(
)](1[
)1(
t
t
t
t
c
c
C
C
3.0=
 which measures the degree of consumption sub-
optimality arising from the two types of market failure, namely network externalities and 
monopoly deadweight loss. Again to get a sense of the order of magnitude we taking 
α , at 2.0=β , 64.1* ≈tt cc  (see Figure 3). Consumption can be drastically below 
                                                                                                                                                                             
heuristic sense, though it violates the condition ), then the social planner’s and the 
monopoly’s supplies of capital coincide.  
βα >− )1(
13 
 the socially optimal rate.13 It is well justified, therefore, for anti-trust legislation in the 
United States, and indeed elsewhere, to take a tough stance against monopolies that thrive 
on network effects. The doctrine of Second Best tells us, of course, that we should be 
careful as to which specific policy measure would improve rather than worsen welfare. 
Instead of searching for the optimal policy, we examine in the next section a particularly 
but relevant policy. The attempt to break up Microsoft amounts to enforcing rivalry into 
the network industry. The resulting competition will however only be among a few. We 
examine this below under a duopoly setting.  
 
Put Figure 3 about here 
 
4 Enforced Rivalry 
In order to study enforce rivalry, we focus on two alternative duopoly structures, namely 
Cournot and Bertrand. Our aim is to compare the duopoly equilibrium with monopoly, 
and with the social optimum. 
 Denote the two Cournot K-suppliers by a subscript 2,1=C . The network equation 
(2’) now takes the form  where  is output sold by company C. It implies 
that network effect is completely supplier-specific.
β)( CKA = CK
14,15 Y-producers continue to take A as 
                                                          
13 In fact == →→
t
t
t
t
c
c
C
C *
0
*
0 limββlim 29.11
)(
)](1[
)1(lim
1
1
0 ≈+=




 ++−
− −−− −−
→ α
αβαβαα
α ααβα βα
β .  
14 
14 We need this assumption to keep the picture simple and clear. Technically network effect can either be 
curtailed or enhanced by making one’s product compatible or not compatible with rivals’. Both strategies 
have been used in practice. For instance, Sun Microsystems was keen to license Java to everyone, even 
including its arch competitor, Microsoft. But the latter was careful to retain its right to “improve” Java in 
the licensing agreement, and then went on to add its own “improvements” that only worked on the 
Windows platform.  
 given. Summing (3) over each group of K-users, and let denote total labor used in 
each group ( ), the demand for each duopoly company is  
CL
LLL =+ 21
β
α
α
−−
−
1
1
CL
K =2
βα
α
βαβαα −−
−
−− 
+= 1
1
1
1
)]([KC 

2
L
  ( ) ααβαα −−−−−= 1 11 1 CC LpK .     (21) 
 Taking his rival’s output as given, firm C maximizes profits (  in each 
t, implying  
)CC KpK −
  ββαβαα −−+= 1
1
)]([CK .    (22) 
 Both Cournot (and later Bertrand) firms produce the same output despite its firm-
specific network effect, and both share the technology of converting one Y into one K at 
each t. Imposing the implied symmetry condition CKK =1 , the Cournot 
equilibrium output of each firm is 
  .   (23) 
Total K supplied is . Comparing with (8), the Cournot structure supplies CK2
)1(2 βαβ −−−  times the monopoly output. For 3.=α  and 2.=β , 75.2 )1( =−−− βαβ , 
implying less K is sold than under the monopoly (see Figure 4). This contrasts with the 
conventional picture where Cournot competition raises total output over the 
monopolist’s. The reason behind this is as follows. Each firm serves only half of the 
market and enjoys half of the network externality. The reduced network effect more than 
offsets the competition effect leading to smaller output in the aggregate. Figure 4 shows 
                                                                                                                                                                             
e
ββ
15 It would be interesting to investigate more sophisticated versions of competing networks, for xample 
, where  ( = ‘not C’) is the total capital of the rival’s type in use, and ~0 . 
To keep our scope manageable we choose . 
~
CC KKA /= CK / C/ 1<<< ββ
0~ =β
15 
 also that relative supply of K under Cournot falls when network effect is more 
pronounced. 
 
Put Figure 4 about here 
 
 The Cournot equilibrium income and consumption are 
βα
α
βα
βα
βα
β
βαα −−
−
−−
+
−−
−
⋅+= 1
1
11 )]([2 tC LY ; 
 βα
α
βα
βα
βα
β
βααβαα −−
−
−−
+
−−
−
⋅++−= 1
1
11 )]()][(1[2 tC LC ;  (24) 
and in per capita terms 
 βα
β
βα
βα
βα
β
βαα −−−−
+
−−
−
⋅+= 111 )]([2 tC Ly ;     
βα
β
βα
βα
βα
β
βααβαα −−−−
+
−−
−
⋅++−= 111 )]()][(1[2 tC Lc .  (25) 
Capital and income under Cournot are again a fraction )1(2 βαβ −−−  of their 
counter part under monopoly. The same is true in per capita terms. Their growth rates, 
however, are identical to those under monopoly. As argued above this is because the 
competitive incentive to provide more output than the monopoly is more than outweighed 
by the opposite effect from the lost in network externalities.  
This has important Second Best implications on policy, and this constitutes the 
third important conclusion of this paper. As an insight from Second Best, enforced rivalry 
in the form of Cournot would have led us further away from the social optimum. Further, 
referring again to Figure 4, the degree of sub-optimality increases with the extent of 
network externality β . 
16 
 Now we turn to Bertrand. The two Bertrand K-suppliers are denoted . 
Network technology continues to be supplier-specific, i.e. . Bertrand 
competition reduces the price of K to marginal cost, which is one in each t. Using this in 
(21) and imposing symmetry,  
2,1=B
β)( BKA =
  
βα
α
βαα −−
−
−− 

=== 1
1
1
1
21 2
LKKK B .     (26) 
National output and consumption are 
  βα
α
βα
βα
βα
β
α −−
−
−−
+
−−
−
⋅= 1
1
112 tB LY ; 
βα
α
βα
βα
βα
β
αα −−
−
−−
+
−−
−
⋅−= 1
1
11 )1(2 tB LC , (27) 
and in per capita terms 
  βα
β
βα
βα
βα
β
α −−−−
+
−−
−
⋅= 1112 tB Ly ; βα
β
βα
βα
βα
β
αα −−−−
+
−−
−
⋅−= 111 )1(2 tB Lc . (28) 
 Intriguingly, while the Cournot equilibrium levels of income and consumption are 
a fraction )1(2 βαβ −−−  of their monopolist counter parts, from (27) and (28) the Bertrand 
equilibrium levels of income and consumption are a fraction )1(2 βαβ −−−  of their social 
optimality counter parts. Cournot, Bertrand and the monopoly are all sub-optimal, but 
what are their rankings in terms of (sub-) optimality? It is clear that Bertrand compares 
favorably with Cournot. The question is whether Bertrand is socially superior to 
monopoly to justify enforced rivalry? It turns out that the answer depends on the extent of 
network externalities. 
 Using (27) and (10), βα
βα
βα
β
βα −−
−−
−−
−
+== 11 )(2
y
y
Y
Y BB . Take 3.=α , 1=
Y
YB  if 
38.≈β  (see Figure 5). As Figure 5 shows, aggregate and per capita income are higher 
along the monopoly path than Bertrand’s if network effect is more pronounced, and 
conversely. 
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Put Figures 5 and 6 about here 
 
 Similar conclusion holds for consumption. Using (28), (11) and (13), 
βα
βα
βα
β
βαβαα
α −− −−−−− ++−
−== 11 )(
)](1[
)1(2
c
c
C
C BB . Take 3.=α , 1=
C
CB  if 338.≈β  (see 
Figure 6). It shows also that aggregate and per capita consumption are higher along the 
monopoly path than Bertrand’s if network effect is more pronounced, and conversely.  
Our fourth conclusion in this paper may be put as follows. By enforcing rivalry, 
the ranks of alternative market set-ups are, firstly, Cournot is invariably the worst 
amongst the three; secondly, Bertrand f  monopoly if network effects are sufficiently 
strong, but Bertrand  monopoly otherwise. In general, anti-trust policies need to be 
carefully devised and sweeping judgments are not supported by theory. In the event of 
breaking up a monopoly such as Microsoft, for instance, is more likely to improve 
welfare if the resulting price competition is fierce, and if network effects are sufficiently 
overwhelming.  
p
 
5 Network-cum-Innovative Growth 
We now return to a task set aside earlier, namely of building networked growth not on 
population growth, but on Romer’s (1990) endogenous innovation. This exercise is 
important not only comparison reasons, but also it allows us to study the interactions 
between networks and innovation. For simplicity we follow Barro and Sala-I-Martin’s 
(1995) interpretation of Romer (ibid.). We shall modify Romer’s and our model where 
appropriate to preserve steady state growth. 
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 Suppose network effect is associated with the number of intermediate products 
available.16 The production function for firm i is  
  , ααβ )(
1
1 ∑
=
−⋅=
N
j
ijii XLNY 0>β .    (29) 
The demand equations for intermediate goods and labor are 
  αα
β
α −−= 1
1
1 )( jiij PLNX ;    (30) 
  )()1( wYL ii ⋅−= α .     (31) 
A representative intermediate producer j, being a monopoly protected by an 
infinite patent, converts a unit of final good Y into a unit of X, and earns present value 
returns  
  V      (32) dveXPt tvrjt j
)()1()( −⋅−
∞ ⋅⋅−= ∫
where interest rate r is constant in equilibrium.  
We abandon labor growth in our model and adopt Romer’s constant population L. 
Summing (30) over users i, the aggregate demand for intermediate j is,  
  αα
β
α −−= 1
1
1 )( jj PLNX .    (33) 
Firm j chooses  to maximize jP jj XP ⋅− )1(  at each date in V . The choice is  )(t
  α/1=jP .      (34) 
Feeding this back into (33), 
  αα
β
α −−= 1
2
1 LNX j .     (35) 
Assume monopoly j, in evaluating (34), takes only the existing network effect 
( ) into account, and does not form any expectation on the change of . More tN tN
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16 We may think of them as complementary goods, either of the hardware-hardware or hardware-software 
 importantly, each j is too small to recognize it’s own impact on  when deciding to 
enter the industry. This pair of assumptions seems not too strong, reminiscing simply the 
nature of monopolistic competition. Using (34) and (35), we get  
tN
tvr ( −⋅
η
)
       
  dveNLt
t
)1
2
1 1)( −
∞−− ∫⋅⋅
−⋅⋅= αα
β
αα
αV .  (36) 
Now we come to the crux of network-cum-innovative growth. If we follow 
Romer (ibid.) and assume a constant cost (η ) of innovative entry into the intermediate 
good industry, long-term steady state will not be possible. The growth in N enhances 
network effect, which in turn increases the returns to innovative activity, inducing a 
forever increasing fraction of resources to be poured into innovative activity. To see this 
more clearly we press on for a moment with a constant η . Equating it with V  we have )(t
  αα
β
αα
α
η
−− ⋅

 −⋅⋅


= 1
2
1 1NLr .    (37) 
Interest rate rises with the number of intermediates N, instead of being a constant as is 
expected in a steady state. If we follow through with constant  it is easy to show that 
consumption and income growth would not be constant either. 
 In order to counter the accelerating incentive to invest, the obvious modification 
is to make innovative cost η  rise with innovation; i.e. (Nf=η  and .0'>f 17 More 
specifically, in order to keep interest rate r constant, η  must rise at exactly the rate 
Nγα
β ⋅−1 . We assume therefore  
                                                                                                                                                                      
variety. 
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17 There is no a priori reason to believe that the innovative cost is linear (e.g. Scherer (1980), and Kamien 
and Schwartz (1975, 1982)). In fact as a country becomes richer, the cost of inventing a new commodity 
also rises and in 2002 it most probably costs more, in absolute dollar terms, than in 1902. This is enough to 
justify our assumption of rising innovative cost.  
   α
β
ση −⋅= 1N ,   0>σ .    (38) 
Using this in (37) we have  
  ααα
α
σ
−⋅

 −⋅

= 1
21Lr .     (39) 
This interest rate and innovative cost (38) will peg the rate of return V  to maintain a 
constant (and assumed positive) rate of innovation 
)(t
Nγ .18 
Assumption (38) is also sufficient for steady state growth in consumption and 
income. To see this let households have Ramsey utility dtec tρ
θ
θ
−∞
−
⋅



−
−= ∫0
1
1
1
c
U , the 
maximization of it yields the growth rate of per capita consumption γ  and by using (39) 
it becomes 
  


 −⋅

 −⋅⋅= − ραα
ασθγ α1
21)/()/1( Lc .   (40) 
Summing (29) across i, aggregate output is Y , and using (35), 
we have 
ααβ XLN −+ ⋅= 11
  α
α
α
βα
α −−
+−
⋅= 1
2
1
1
LNY      (41) 
which implies NyY γα
βαγγ ⋅−
+−==
1
1 . Income must grow faster than innovation since 
the latter is becoming increasingly expensive over time. 
 The economy’s budget constraint is NXNNY N −⋅⋅⋅−= − γσ α
β
1C . Using (41) 
and (35), we get 
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18 In principle we can build a model of investment and borrowing to further justify our assumption of 
interest rate determination. We refrain from doing so here to keep our scope manageable. 
   ( ααααβα ασγα −−−+− −−= 121211 LLNC N ).   (42) 
Thus consumption grows at the same rate as income, and everything grows at α
βα
−
+−
1
1  
times the rate of innovation. Romer’s (ibid) model can be seen as a special case of ours 
with 0→β , when consumption and income both grow at the same rate as innovation. 
 We state the final result of this paper in some order of magnitude. If 3.=α , 
}3.0,2.0,1.0{=β  implies networked growth in consumption and income to be 
}42.1,28.1,14.1{
1
1 =−
+−
α
βα  times larger than simple innovative growth a la Romer (see 
Figure 7). If the economy with Romer’s endogenous innovation grows at two percent, 
say, with network effects it could become (  percents depending on the 
size of 
}84.2,56.2,28.2
β . 
Put Figure 7 about here 
 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
Our search for a new growth engine for the IT economy has proved fruitful. We are now 
reasonably sure that network effect can generate growth. It is, moreover, growth engine 
of a kind that we have not encountered before in the literature. In Section two we saw it 
‘hinges’ on population growth and multiplies it to produce per capita income and 
consumption growth. In Section five it interacts with endogenous innovation and growth 
rate rises with network effects. We also studied social optimality and Second Best policy 
issues. It is perhaps worth putting our five major conclusions together as we end. 
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  First, network effect capable of generating long-term per capita growth, and it 
does so by ‘hinging’ on population growth, which is, in itself, incapable of generating per 
capita income and consumption growth (Section two). 
 Second, networked growth rates of income and consumption are in fact socially 
optimal, but the monopoly paths are everywhere below the socially optimal paths. The 
degree of sub-optimality can be substantial (Section three). 
 Third, as an insight from Second Best, enforced rivalry in the form of Cournot 
would do worse than either monopoly or Bertrand duopoly, thus leading us further away 
from the social optimum (Section four). 
Fourth, again in terms of social welfare, Bertrand is superior to monopoly if 
network effects are sufficiently strong, but inferior otherwise (Section four). 
Fifth, network effect interacts with endogenous innovation increases growth rate. 
If growth were otherwise two percent, network effect of the ‘reasonable magnitude’ 
would add perhaps another percentage point to growth at the most.   
 So it is justified to say that at least IT network effects have made the new 
economy fundamentally different from the old by increasing the long-term equilibrium 
rate of growth. This new growth rate, while being higher than before if network effects 
were absent or insignificant, is sub-optimal (Figure 3 shows that consumption under 
monopoly can be almost fifty percent below optimal). Social loss arises not only from 
network externality, but also from the conventional monopoly deadweight loss.  
 So it is also justified to ask whether we should take drastic anti-trust measures to 
alleviate the high degree of social loss. Our conclusion is certainly against breaking up a 
monopoly if the resulting rivalry is Cournot. We are for it if the enforced rivalry is 
Bertrand, and if network effect is substantial. 
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Figure 1a. Per capita income growth rate with .01.,3. == nα  
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Figure 1b. Per capita income growth rate; .02.,3. == nα  
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Figure 2. Comparing the socially optimal supply of capital and monopoly’s supply, 
.3.=α  
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Figure 3. Comparing the socially optimal and monopoly’s consumption paths, .3.=α  
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Figure 4. Cournot supplies βαβ −−− 12  times the monopoly supply of K; this figure shows 
the graph with .3.=α  
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Figure 5. Comparing income paths between Bertrand and monopoly, .3.=α  
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Figure 6. Comparing consumption paths between Bertrand and monopoly, .3.=α  
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Figure 7. All variables grow at )1()1( αβα −+−  times the rate of (Romer’s) innovative 
growth when network effect is added; the figure shows the graph with .3.=α  
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